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LECTURE
WHAT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
CAN LEARN FROM
THE SUPREME COURT—AND VICE VERSA

*

**

ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS

Thank you, Dean Farley, Don Dunner, and the Finnegan firm.
I would especially like to thank Michael Carroll for inviting me to
deliver this Lecture. It is a real privilege to have been asked, and a
pleasure to be here. I would also like to thank him for suggesting
that I talk about one of my favorite topics. I have been a student of
the Federal Circuit for some time. The statute enacting the court was
passed while I was clerking in the Second Circuit for Judge Feinberg,
and I have to tell you, the smile on his face when he discovered he
would never have to hear another patent case was a beauty to behold.
Also, while I was a law clerk to Chief Justice Burger at the Supreme
Court, the hard work of getting the court organized was taking place.
Justice Burger took a special interest in judicial administration,
so during that period, he spent time with Howard Markey. Markey
had been the Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, and he was slated to become the First Circuit’s first Chief.
The two of them decided that since I had been a chemist before I
* The Fifth Annual Finnegan Distinguished Lecture on Intellectual Property,
presented on Oct. 16, 2009, was hosted by the Finnegan law firm, the American
University Washington College of Law (WCL), and the Program on Information Justice
and Intellectual Property (PIJIP). Introductory remarks from Christine Farley,
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at WCL, from Don Dunner, Partner at the
Finnegan firm, and from Michael Carroll, Professor of Law at WCL, have been
omitted. This Lecture has been edited.
** Pauline Newman Professor of Law and co-Director of the Engelberg Center
on Innovation Law and Policy, New York University School of Law.
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went to law school, and because I was interested in patent law,
I should be Markey’s inaugural Federal Circuit law clerk. It would
have been a lot of fun, but unfortunately my life—my husband and
children—were moving back to New York. So I had to decline, and I
started to teach at NYU Law School instead. Nonetheless, I remained
curious about how the court was faring. And at its fifth anniversary,
which was right before I was to get tenure, I decided to write my
1
“tenure piece” on its jurisprudence. Since then, I have revisited the
question of the court periodically.
To a student of patents, civil procedure, and legal institutions, the
Federal Circuit is a superb subject for academic inquiry because it was
actually created as an experiment; there are not too many
experiments in law, so this one was pretty special. What happened is
this: in the early 1970s, federal appellate dockets had increased to
the point where the regional circuits could no longer handle the
load. The first impulse was to add new judges to existing circuits.
But that would have been of limited help because increasing the
number of judges would lead to more intra-circuit inconsistency and
would breed more cases for the circuit courts to decide. Adding new
circuits was also a possibility, but such an addition would also have
been problematic because more circuits would mean new
opportunities for inter-circuit splits, and that would breed more cases
for the Supreme Court to decide.
The Hruska Commission was convened to study the issue, and in
1973, it conceived the idea of experimenting with specialization—
with pulling a class or classes of appeals out of the regional system
2
and funneling them into a special appellate tribunal. The new court
would reduce the dockets of the regional circuits, and it could,
in theory, do much more. Its presence could also diminish
opportunities for forum shopping and take pressure off the Supreme
Court. If it were small enough to speak with a single voice, it could
bring more coherence to the law it administered. And, with greater
expertise in the field, it might decide cases more efficiently. As Judge
Markey told Congress, “[I]f I am doing brain surgery every day, day in
and day out, chances are very good that I will do your brain surgery
much quicker . . . than someone who does brain surgery once every

1. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
2. See Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and
Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195
(setting forth the final recommendations of the Hruska Commission).

2010]

FINNEGAN LECTURE

789

3

couple of years.” Although the Hruska Commission report actually
made several suggestions for fields that would be appropriate for
specialization, patent law was, if you will, “the killer app.”
Way back in 1911, Learned Hand was called upon to decide
4
whether purified adrenaline was patentable subject matter. It was a
significant issue then, and the case retains its importance now,
because its holding is thought to support patenting in the biotech
sector. Significantly, in his rather brilliant opinion, Judge Hand
nevertheless ended as follows:
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary
condition of the law which makes it possible for a man without any
knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such
questions as these. . . . How long we shall continue to blunder
along . . . no one knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized
by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to
5
effect some such advance.

Congress decided, in light of the Hruska Commission Report, that
seventy-one years of blundering was enough. The “advance”—the
Federal Circuit—would, in one fell swoop, solve the problems the
Commission was formed to address, answer Learned Hand’s plea for
technologically expert judging in patent cases, and bring that smile to
Judge Feinberg’s face.
But it is important to remember that this was an experiment, and it
was risky. Specialization had been tried in the past and, for the most
part, failed. The poster child was the Commerce Court, which was
created in 1910 to review decisions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The court was so hated—by the railroads, by shippers,
by the public—that it was disbanded within three years of its
founding (and one of its five judges was also impeached, but that may
6
be a different story).
In fact, there were many reasons to be concerned about
specialization. Isolating patent law could favor special interests.
Appointments to regional courts—that is, to generalist courts—are so
3. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. 42–43 (1981) (statement of the Honorable Howard T. Markey, C.J.,
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
769 (2004) (tracing the development of the Federal Circuit); Dreyfuss, supra note 1
(same).
4. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911),
rev’d on other grounds, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
5. Id. at 115.
6. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377,
391–93 (1990).
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highly contested by so many special interest groups that they dilute
each other’s effectiveness. But when there is only one field to fight
about, those who are better organized and have the most money—
which, in this context, is probably patent holders—can “capture” the
appointments process so that judges are predisposed to their
interests. Even without capture, patent holders would, it was thought,
have an advantage. As repeat players, they could manipulate the way
that important issues were framed for litigation.
There were also fears that the judges might develop tunnel vision.
The saying is, if you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
In an effort to support innovation, the judges might be so focused on
patents, they would ignore non-patent incentives to innovate, such as
intellectual curiosity, the availability of prizes, or competition.
Furthermore, people were worried about the Federal Circuit’s
isolation. They were concerned that the court’s exclusive jurisdiction
would take patent law out of the judicial mainstream and deprive the
7
law of the benefits of cross-fertilization. Finally, the bar was worried
that there would be difficult boundary problems on the allocation of
cases among the appellate courts.
Congress took these concerns seriously. While the Federal Circuit
was given authority over all, or, as we will see, nearly all patent
appeals, it is not specialized in the traditional sense because there are
many other sources of its judicial authority. These include such areas
as diverse as contracts, torts, export controls, labor law, and energy
8
issues. Other industries and bar groups are therefore involved in
lobbying for appointments, and the judges must stay abreast of
non-patent legal developments.
Indeed, from most perspectives, the Hruska Commission’s
9
experiment has been a raging success. The court has now passed the
quarter-century mark. The patent industries and the patent bar are
delighted with it, and—in what might be the biggest compliment
10
of all—many other countries are copying it.
On the whole, the
concerns people expressed about specialization have not eventuated.
There has been no capture of the appointment process. If anything,
there is concern that not enough appointees have had patent
7. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 396–97 (2001).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006).
9. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008).
10. An example is the intellectual property court recently established in Taiwan.
See Nicole M. Lin, IP Court Releases First Year Performance, TAI E QUARTERLY,
Nov. 2009, at 1–2, available at http://www.taie.com.tw/English/pdf/01305.pdf.
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experience. Nor have repeat players distorted the law, and for good
reason. People in the research and development business are both
producers and users of technology. They do not want overly
protective law for the cases where they are accused of infringing, and
they do not want overly permissive law for the cases where they are
the right holders. To be sure, there were some boundary problems,
but the Supreme Court’s early interventions largely cleared them up.
11
In United States v. Hohri, the Court made it clear that, unlike the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA)—another failed
12
experiment in specialization —the Federal Circuit had “case” rather
than “issue” jurisdiction: once a case is properly before the Federal
13
Circuit, it decides all of the issues, not just the patent ones. At the
14
same time, in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. and Holmes
15
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court
withheld Federal Circuit jurisdiction when the patent issues in a case
16
appear only in the defense or in a counterclaim. These decisions
have the benefit of giving the court a somewhat broader perspective
on innovation policy, while also creating an interchange with other
national courts.
Most important, however, the Federal Circuit’s success can be
attributed to the many positive contributions it has made to patent
law. Most obviously, for patent appeals, the Federal Circuit is almost
the only game in town. As a result, it has eliminated forum shopping
and has attained a high degree of national uniformity, and that is a
value that the industry positively cherishes. No one will make heavy
commitments of time or money if there is uncertainty about what law
is going to apply. There are some exceptions here, including, as
Kimberly Moore has shown, some forum shopping at the district
17
court level. But the situation has vastly improved.
The Federal Circuit has also made a key procedural innovation.
18
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the court, with the Supreme
19
Court’s approval, eliminated jury trials on claim construction. That
11. 482 U.S. 64 (1987).
12. See Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 396–99.
13. Hohri, 482 U.S. at 74–76.
14. 486 U.S. 800, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (1988).
15. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002).
16. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830–31, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803–04; Christianson,
486 U.S. at 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113.
17. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001).
18. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
19. Id. at 390, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1471 (“We accordingly think there is
sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities
that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial . . . .”).
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ruling created more predictability in the interpretation of patent
claims, yet another value that the industry holds in high esteem.
To be sure, there are still complaints about the continuing
indeterminacy of claim construction, but in an empirical study,
Jeffrey Lefstin demonstrated that the level of uncertainty in this area
specifically is no different than that for contract interpretation
20
generally. Indeed, in another empirical work, Lefstin showed much
more: that the Federal Circuit’s developed expertise in patent law
has made the law more predictable across a whole range of issues,
21
including infringement, validity, and inequitable conduct.
And
according to Robert Gomulkiewicz, the court has also become highly
22
knowledgeable about the technology business. Because the court
sees so many cases about patent transactions, it is now an influential
voice within the federal judiciary as a whole on questions involving
licensing.
Given the happiness within the bar and within the patent
industries, and given the eagerness of other countries to copy the
Hruska Commission’s experiment, it is perhaps a surprise that lately
the Supreme Court has changed its practice. In the first twenty or so
years, its review of the Federal Circuit was largely intermittent and
confined to procedural issues—cases like Hohri, Christianson, Holmes,
and Markman. However, the Court has recently begun to intervene
regularly; it has begun to address the substance of patent law;
and it has reversed, vacated, or questioned nearly every decision:
23
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., on standing to challenge a patent;
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., on nonobviousness
24
(inventiveness); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., on
25
the doctrine of equivalents; Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
26
on the statutory research exemption; Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
27
Electronics, Inc., on patent exhaustion; eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
20. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive
Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1065 (2007).
21. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1072 (2007).
22. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence:
Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 202 (2009).
23. 549 U.S. 118, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007), rev’g 427 F.3d 958,
76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
24. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007), rev’g 119 Fed. App’x 282
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
25. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 558,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
26. 545 U.S. 193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2005), vacating 331 F.3d 860,
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
27. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008), rev’g 453 F.3d 1364,
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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28

L.L.C., on injunctive relief; Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink,
29
Inc., on whether patents imply market power; and Microsoft Corp. v.
30
AT&T Corp., on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
Admittedly, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision in
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred International, on what constitutes
31
patentable subject matter. However, in Laboratory Corp. of America
32
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., on a dissent from the dismissal
of certiorari, Justice Breyer cast doubt on the Federal Circuit’s subject
33
matter jurisprudence. And there is yet another subject matter case
34
pending in the Supreme Court—Bilski v. Kappos —where there are
similar doubts about the Federal Circuit’s rule.
Significantly, we are in an era in which Supreme Court review is
otherwise declining. Furthermore, heightened review of patent cases
is happening in the absence of the circuit splits that usually attract
Supreme Court attention. Accordingly, one really must wonder
about this level of activity and whether it is an implicit criticism of the
Federal Circuit’s work.
I, however, am going to argue tonight that heightened review
should not be taken as a criticism of the Federal Circuit. The
Supreme Court’s interest in patent law is at worst neutral: every
circuit comes into focus periodically, and now that the Federal
Circuit has come of age, it is taking its turn. More to the point,
Supreme Court involvement in Federal Circuit decisions should be
regarded as highly salutary, for these two tribunals have a great deal
to learn from one another.
What I mean is this. The Federal Circuit must, obviously, learn
from the Supreme Court, for it is bound by the Supreme Court’s
decisions. But the relationship between these two courts is not simply
28. 547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006), vacating 401 F.3d 1323,
74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
29. 547 U.S. 28, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2006), vacating 396 F.3d 1342,
73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
30. 550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007), rev’g 414 F.3d 1366,
75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
31. 534 U.S. 124, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (2001), aff’g 200 F.3d 1374,
53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
32. 548 U.S. 124, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (2006) (per curiam), denying cert. to
370 F.3d 1354, 370 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
33. See id. at 132–34, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068–69 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Federal Circuit’s holding in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
is inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on patentable subject matter).
34. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(en banc), cert. granted sub nom., Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), and argued sub
nom., Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2009).
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a matter of judicial hierarchy. They have a great deal in common.
Both of these courts are caught in the Hruska Commission’s
experiment; they must both figure out how a judiciary largely
committed to generalist adjudication should deal with a court that is
so differently constituted. And both courts are, in a sense, courts of
last resort (at least, the Federal Circuit is when the Supreme Court is
not so focused on its activities). In that capacity, both have weighty
responsibilities regarding the substance of national law and for
supervising the courts below them. Of course, they see these
problems from different perspectives. Sharing their views—learning
from one another—could enhance the operation of the patent
system, shed light on the costs and benefits of specialization, ease the
path for other specialized courts, and improve judicial administration
more generally.
Let me start with the first area of specialization, where there are
two distinct problems: the Federal Circuit’s relationship to the
generalist Supreme Court, which reviews its work, and its relationship
to the generalist trial courts, whose work it reviews. I will describe
both problems and then discuss the lessons to be learned.
Of these, the harder question is the Federal Circuit’s relationship
to the Supreme Court. Obviously, the Federal Circuit is subject to
Supreme Court review—the same as the other circuit courts—but
review here seems particularly intrusive. The judges on the Federal
Circuit have built up experience over their years of service, while the
Justices of the Supreme Court do not even have a generalist’s
knowledge of patent law. After all, their own experience on lower
court benches could not possibly have given them any perspective on
patent law because—and there is some irony here—all the patent
cases had been diverted to the Federal Circuit by the time most of
them were appointed. Justice Stevens is an exception, and he is
35
approaching retirement.
On the one hand, Supreme Court involvement dilutes the Federal
Circuit’s hard-won expertise, but on the other hand, the Supreme
Court’s involvement may be more important in the case of the
Federal Circuit than it is for the other courts it reviews. Consider the
common law. Although patent law is nominally statutory, it leaves
wide gaps for judge-made law. And common law judges make law in
an evolutionary and collaborative fashion.

35. See Justice Stevens Slows His Hiring at High Court, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/supremecourtjustices/200909-02-stevens_N.htm.
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36

Take the Evarts Act, which established the regional circuits.
At the time the Act was passed, the question was whether these new
regional circuits would be bound by each other’s law. An approach
requiring appellate courts to follow one another’s precedent would
have had the benefit of guaranteed national uniformity.
Nonetheless, the decision was made to give each circuit judicial
independence—that is, to forego national uniformity—so that the
law would “percolate,” allowing the fittest rule to survive. “Survival of
the fittest” is no longer possible for patent law, because apart from
cases in the Holmes or Christianson posture, the only circuit court
hearing patent cases is now the Federal Circuit.
If, then, we are going to get evolution in patent law, it has to be
through a different mechanism. Supreme Court involvement in
37
patent decisions is one such avenue.
There is another reason
Supreme Court involvement is necessary: despite congressional
attempts to give the Federal Circuit cases outside patent law, patents
remain at the core of its docket, at least in the innovation area. The
court has little chance to see how patents fit into the economy as a
whole. The Supreme Court does have that perspective.
And in the recent group of cases, we see the difference Supreme
Court involvement can make at both the micro and the macro level.
Thus, at the micro level the Supreme Court has made smallish
doctrinal adjustments intended to keep patent law in the mainstream.
In eBay, the Court claimed it was making sure that the standards for
38
injunctive relief stay the same across all federal causes of action;
39
in MedImmune, it made the test for standing uniform; in Illinois Tool,
40
it equalized the treatment of antitrust defendants.
At the macro level, the Supreme Court has, essentially, pressed the
reset button. Although I earlier described the establishment of the
Federal Circuit as an outgrowth of administrative concerns, one can
also read the legislative history as revealing a strong interest in
strengthening patent value and stemming what was then perceived as
36. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
37. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 658 (2009).
38. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1577, 1579–80 (2006) (characterizing the rule that the Federal Circuit had
applied as “unique to patent disputes”).
39. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1234 (2007) (holding that a patent licensee in good standing is not
required to breach its license prior to challenging the validity of the underlying
patent pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act).
40. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801, 1808 (2006) (holding that “in all cases involving a tying arrangement,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product”).
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a flight to trade secrecy. The Federal Circuit took this commitment
to heart (which, in part, may be why the patent bar has been so
pleased with its performance). However, its success has turned into
something of a mixed blessing: legal scholars, economists, the
Federal Trade Commission, the National Academies, and even some
in the patent industries have expressed concern that there are now
too many patents, that they cover too much economic activity, that
patent quality is declining, and that the high cost of patent litigation
41
is chilling innovation.
The Supreme Court has moved in very effectively. For example,
by giving district courts discretion over awarding injunctive relief,
eBay’s limit on permanent injunctive relief should reduce incentives
42
to litigate; KSR, which raised the standard of nonobviousness,
relieved concerns about patent quality; Justice Breyer’s dissent in
LabCorp clearly flagged the problem of patent proliferation. As he
stated: “[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather
43
than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”
Of course, many of these changes could have been made by
Congress, but as its recent prolonged attempt at patent reform
44
suggests, there can be wisdom in relying on a judicial approach.
In sum, that is one problem: figuring out how the Supreme Court
can use the generalist knowledge derived from its unique position in
a way that takes account of the Federal Circuit’s expertise in
technology, patents, and licensing.
The other problem is determining the Federal Circuit’s role as a
specialist appellate court reviewing a generalist trial court. The
problem here is that appellate courts generally defer to the factual
41. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A. Merrill &
Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt074.pdf.
42. 547 U.S. at 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
43. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126,
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1066 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
44. Reform bills include H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2006); the Patents Depend on
Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong.; S. 3923, 109th Cong. (2006); and the
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. The 2007 proposals of the 110th
Congress include S. 1145 and H.R. 1908. Most recently, Congress is considering the
Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong., and the Patent Reform Act of
2009, S. 515, 111th Cong.
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determinations made by trial courts. In federal courts, deference is
required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in
the run-of-the-mill case, the Supreme Court’s steadfast enforcement
of Rule 52 makes sense. After all, the trial court is in a unique
position regarding facts; the judge listens to the witnesses and learns
about the documentary evidence as it is introduced. But that
comparative advantage is diminished in patent cases. After all, most
trial judges have very little experience in high-tech cases and some
are very uncomfortable with technological complexity.
But the Federal Circuit does not have that problem. Besides,
it chooses clerks for their technical backgrounds and it can hire staff
to advise it on technical matters. Accordingly, a strong argument can
be made that the relationships between these courts should be
different. And significantly, the countries that have copied the idea
of specialized patent courts have mostly established their patent
courts at the trial court level, which is some indication that the real
gains from specialization are reaped with respect to fact-finding.
If that is true, it would be highly advantageous to find a way for the
Federal Circuit to make an equivalent contribution, even though it is
an appellate court.
So, those are the two specialization issues—what can the courts
learn from one another? Although the Supreme Court is the older
institution—and supreme—the fact of the matter is that the Federal
Circuit faces these specialization issues more regularly. As a result, it
has the most to teach. Starting at the end, with the question of trial
court review: since its earliest days, the Federal Circuit has been
attentive to the question of effective review of fact-finding. Likely, its
concern initially arose because it was Chief Judge Markey’s view that
the way to establish the court’s reputation would be to straighten out
the mess that was nonobviousness, where the disparate views on the
regional circuits had given rise to the most extremely corrosive form
of forum shopping. In its earliest nonobviousness cases, the Federal
Circuit therefore undertook a detailed examination of the patents in
issue, at the prior art, and at their relationship. If it thought the trial
court was wrong on nonobviousness, it reversed.
45
What happened? In Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp.,
the Supreme Court held that Rule 52 permits appellate courts to
reverse factual findings only when they are clearly erroneous, not

45. 475 U.S. 809, 229 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 478 (1986) (per curiam).
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46

merely wrong.
And that Rule applied even though the Federal
Circuit’s grasp of the facts was clearly better than the trial court’s.
That was a major loss. But the Federal Circuit did not give up on
the enterprise both for nonobviousness and in general. Instead,
it adopted two other approaches. First, it required the trial courts
to apply specific analytical techniques to factual questions.
For nonobviousness, for example, it required courts to examine
secondary considerations—such things as commercial success and
47
long-felt need.
Furthermore, it required proof of a teaching,
48
suggestion, or motivation for combining prior art. In addition, it
started classifying many of the more complex technical issues as
questions of law, rather than issues of fact, so that Rule 52 would not
49
bar de novo review. The Federal Circuit has, in short, efficiently
canvassed the ways in which it can bring its expertise to bear on the
facts that affect the outcome of technologically complex cases.
Admittedly, by requiring these analytical techniques, it has sacrificed
flexibility for predictability. But as we saw, improving predictability
has very much pleased the patent industries.
But there is a catch. True, in Markman, the Supreme Court
approved the idea of recharacterizing some factual questions as legal
50
determinations. But at least in part, it did that because the move fit
nicely with the Supreme Court’s own agenda about limiting fact51
finding by juries. In fact, the Supreme Court is busy dismantling the
analytical requirements. In KSR, its own case on nonobviousness, the
Supreme Court began by “rejecting the rigid approach of the Court
52
of Appeals.” And, many of the amicus briefs in Bilski ask the Court
46. Id. at 811, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 749.
47. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538, 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 871, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that evidence of these “secondary
considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record”).
48. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343–44, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430,
1433–34 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
49. Cf. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that “the interpretation
and construction of patent claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights
under the patent, is a matter of law exclusively for the court”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370,
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
50. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388–90, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1461, 1469–70 (1996) (holding that “there is sufficient reason to treat
construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge
in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings,” which
normally fall within the jury’s domain).
51. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1200 (1993) (giving the judge a role as gatekeeper of the evidence submitted to the
jury).
52. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,
1395 (2007).

2010]

FINNEGAN LECTURE

799

to similarly reject, as overly rigid, the Federal Circuit’s rules on
53
determining patentable subject matter.
What the Supreme Court has not done, however, is face the larger
question of expertise head-on. If it does not like rigid rules, perhaps
54
it should use its power under the Rules Enabling Act to change Rule
52. Or, if it does not want to engage in that particular experiment
with Federal Circuit exceptionalism, it could help the Federal Circuit
find the “sweet spot” between rigid rules and standards. Either way,
an acknowledgement of the Federal Circuit’s attempts to deal with
deficiencies in lower courts’ handling of technologically complex
factual issues could improve patent jurisprudence. Taking lessons
from the Federal Circuit might also help the Supreme Court improve
adjudication of technical issues in other complex cases, such as
antitrust and environmental law.
What about the harder question, the one about the Federal
Circuit’s relationship to the Supreme Court? How do we get the
benefits of Supreme Court intervention without sacrificing the
advantages of relying on the Federal Circuit’s growing expertise?
There are two sub-issues here: When should the Supreme Court
intervene—or more accurately, who should decide when the
Supreme Court should decide? And, does the Supreme Court owe
the Federal Circuit any special regard on substantive patent law
questions?
On the first of these issues, I again think that the Supreme Court
could learn a great deal from the Federal Circuit. In the past, the
Supreme Court has sometimes wasted its time. An example is Pfaff v.
55
Wells Electronics, Inc., where the Court reached a perfectly reasonable
56
position on when an invention was “on sale,” but the decision was
no better than the one that the Federal Circuit would have found for
57
Since the Supreme Court’s resources are highly limited,
itself.
53. Brief Amicus Curiae of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Certiorari
at 3, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. filed Mar. 2, 2009), 2009 WL 2445759
(claiming that Congress, the Supreme Court, and independent entities that have
studied patent law “do not advocate limiting the scope of patentable subject
matter”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Medistem Inc. in Support of the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 6, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. filed Feb. 27, 2009), 2009
WL 564646 (“Narrowing the scope of patentable subject matter forces innovators to
use other means of protecting their inventions, such as maintaining the invention as
a trade secret.”); Brief of John P. Sutton Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3,
Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. filed Feb. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 507782 (supporting
certiorari to “clarify the law,” but not to “make commodity trading into patentable
subject matter”).
54. Pub. L. No. 73-415, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
55. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
56. Id. at 57, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
57. Janis, supra note 7, at 412.
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it would be better for it to take the Federal Circuit’s advice on when a
case is cert-worthy.
To a certain extent, that is the way the Court appears to be
operating. Festo, Merck, and Bilski all featured sharp dissents in the
Federal Circuit, and these opinions may have guided the Supreme
Court’s decision to hear those cases. I strongly believe that is the
right approach: to have the Federal Circuit signal the need for
intervention. But I would add two caveats. First, if it is true that the
Supreme Court is learning from the Federal Circuit, then the judges
of the Federal Circuit need to be careful about what it is they teach.
For example, while Supreme Court involvement on patentable
subject matter might ultimately be useful, I would rather have waited
to see how the new standard the Federal Circuit created in its
decision in Bilski played out before the Supreme Court weighed in on
whether the standard is correct. Further, I would not give the
Federal Circuit the only voice in choosing cases to review—the
involvement of others (practitioners, the Solicitor General) will
remain important. As I noted earlier, the Federal Circuit is not
well-positioned to think about how patents fit into the overall
economy or to see when patent doctrine has deviated from general
rules of law. Accordingly, other voices are necessary on those issues.
What the Supreme Court should do once it intervenes is another
issue. Is there reason to give some kind of deference to the Federal
Circuit’s decisions on substantive law?
The Supreme Court has certainly assumed that its role here is to be
the teacher. For example, it has severely criticized the Federal
58
Circuit on departures from precedent: KSR contained that message,
59
and Justice Breyer’s dissent in LabCorp was quite explicit. According
to Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court “has never made such a
statement [referring to the Federal Circuit’s rule in State Street Bank
60
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. on the patentability of
processes] and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances
61
where this Court has held the contrary.”
Nonetheless, it is hard to see how the Federal Circuit could define
its job as merely applying Supreme Court precedent. Technology
58. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,
1395 (2007).
59. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125,
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60. 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
61. LabCorp, 548 U.S. at 136, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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changes rapidly. Since the founding of the Federal Circuit, the
biotech and IT industries exploded, the Internet was established, and
patent exploitation became a global enterprise. The entire structure
of the patent industry changed as universities entered the picture,
joint venturing became common, and new forms of patent
aggregation were developed. And yet, until KSR, the last case on
nonobviousness was 1976; previous to LabCorp, the case on
manipulating information was decided in 1981; until Microsoft, there
were no Supreme Court cases on electronic distribution of patented
materials; until Quanta Computer, there was nothing on modern
value-chain licensing.
John Duffy has written about how, even with limited engagement,
62
the Supreme Court can adequately supervise the Federal Circuit.
And I have just said that on micro and macro issues, the Supreme
Court ought to be the teacher. But should its views always trump?
I would argue that the Supreme Court’s testiness about the Federal
Circuit’s departures from its precedents is often inappropriate, and
that it adversely affects Supreme Court litigation as well. Litigants are
forced to rely on language from ancient case law that no one wants to
resurrect, when they should be suggesting formulations that address
contemporary problems.
A good example is the concept of
63
“synergy.”
In certain respects, then, the Supreme Court ought to
conceptualize its relationship with the Federal Circuit as more of a
dialogue than the product of hierarchy—as I said earlier—as the
substitute for percolation. The mechanism for doing that is certainly
there. Consider patentable subject matter: first, there was—in
Justice Breyer’s words—the Federal Circuit’s “statement” about
patentability in State Street. Then came Justice Breyer’s dissent in
LabCorp. That spurred a set of Federal Circuit cases, culminating in
Bilski, which the Supreme Court then decided to review. Next came
64
Prometheus Laboratory, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Service, another
subject matter case, and Prometheus will, of course, be followed by the
Supreme Court decision in Bilski. So, there is plenty of opportunity
for a really good interchange of ideas, and the Supreme Court seems
62. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 298–99 (2002).
63. See Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 808 n.96 (“A good example is [KSR], where the
Federal Circuit’s nonobviousness jurisprudence was said to conflict with [Black Rock],
and [Sakraida]. However, those cases announced a ‘synergy’ requirement for
combination patents which has long been considered unworkable.” (citations
omitted)).
64. 581 F.3d 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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receptive to that approach. Indeed, even when the Supreme Court
reverses the Federal Circuit’s decisions, the Court rather significantly
leaves implementation questions to the Federal Circuit’s discretion.
One could also think about this institutionally. Is the Supreme
Court the best institution to be setting mid-range policy, by which
I mean crafting the policies relevant to the administration of patent
law? In other technical areas, there is an administrative agency that
fulfills that function. Now, I have left the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) out of this discussion because it was founded before
the Administrative Procedure Act; lacks rule-making authority; and
only sees the issues that arise when a patent is issued, not the ones
65
that come up when patented information is used. Perhaps things
will change under the new Commissioner, David Kappos, but as
currently constituted, the PTO just cannot play the institutional role
66
I am discussing. And as we have seen, Congress is not in a position
to do much on this either. So, we have a technically complex set of
problems, key to our economic health, and something of a vacuum
on the institutional end. Now that all patent cases are before the
Federal Circuit, it is uniquely positioned to take on the job of filling
that void. But for that to happen, the Federal Circuit has to act like a
teacher: it has to explain what policies it is adopting.
This, indeed, is a place where the Federal Circuit could learn from
the Supreme Court: not what the mid-level policy ought to be—
I would leave that to the Federal Circuit—but how to make it evident
what mid-level policies it has chosen and why it has decided to further
them. In other words, the Federal Circuit must articulate the theory
on which it is relying.
The Supreme Court works very hard to explain what it does.
It often describes the alternative ways in which it could decide a case,
it identifies the policy choices associated with each alternative, and it
explains the theory behind the choice it is making. In part, that may
be an outgrowth of confronting circuit court splits—it must explain
to each circuit why it chose the rule that it did—but it is even true of
65. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930, 1933
(1999) (examining the Federal Circuit’s review of the USPTO’s fact-finding
authority); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What
The Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 285–87 (2007);
Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
907, 910–13 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1052 (2003).
66. See generally Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1972–83 (2009) (providing an overview of the PTO’s efforts
to expand its authority in terms of agency status, judicial deference, and rulemaking
authority).
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the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence. For example, KSR laid
out the reasons why the nonobviousness standard needed to be
67
elevated, Festo provided justification for retaining the doctrine of
68
equivalents, and in LabCorp, Justice Breyer made his views
exceptionally clear: “[S]ometimes too much patent protection can
impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful
69
Arts.’”
In contrast, although the Federal Circuit routinely recites policy
justifications for the statutory requirements of patent law, it rarely
provides insight into the policy rationale for its own decisions.
Indeed, some of the judges have publicly suggested that it would be
70
wrong to explain (or even to be motivated by) policy. Now, I have
written elsewhere that the reason for denying policy motives may
have something to do with the experimental nature of the court.
Perhaps it did not want to make waves while it was “on probation” in
71
the public’s mind. But after more than twenty-five years, I think it is
safe to say that the experiment is over. The court is now part of the
fabric of the U.S. judiciary.
Unless the Federal Circuit does a good job articulating, explaining,
and justifying policy, it cannot play the institutional role I envision.
For example, I just mentioned the potential dialogue on patentable
subject matter. But there is a small flaw in the argument: when the
Federal Circuit decided Prometheus, it never engaged Breyer’s dissent
in LabCorp—even though both of the cases were about the same type
72
of invention. Instead, in a footnote, the Federal Circuit dismissed
LabCorp, stating that a “dissent is not controlling law” and that the
claims in the two cases were “different,” but offered no policy-based
explanation as to how they were different enough to mandate different
67. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385,
1396–97 (2007).
68. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732–35,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1709–11 (2002).
69. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126,
79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1066 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
70. See, e.g., Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court, 75 PATENT, TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 22 (2007) (“[N]ot once have we had a discussion as to what
direction the law should take. . . . We have just applied precedent as best we could
determine it to the cases that have come before us.”); Paul Michel, Judicial
Constellations: Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 758
(2004).
71. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 814–27.
72. Compare Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (involving a patent claiming
methods for diagnosing responsiveness to a particular treatment), with LabCorp, 548
U.S. at 125, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066 (involving a patent claiming a method for
diagnosing certain vitamin deficiencies).
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73

results. This is true for other issues as well: Had the Federal Circuit
explained why it was ignoring Rule 52 in Panduit, or why it was
adopting analytical rules, perhaps the Supreme Court might have
taken the problematic nature of its relationship to the trial courts
more seriously.
I hasten to add that, to an extent, the Federal Circuit is learning
this lesson. An example is the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bilski,
which very deliberately and repeatedly referenced Diamond v. Diehr,
74
the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision on the patentability of software.
That approach neatly teed up the problem of relying on outdated
case law. We will have to see whether the Federal Circuit made the
issue of its authority as a specialized court to stray from Supreme
Court precedents clear enough for the Supreme Court to consider
the problem.
The opinion-writing issue allows me to segue into another area
where the courts have a great deal to teach each other, and that is on
dealing with the special problems that come from being a court of
last resort, with supervisory and administrative responsibilities. Once
again, I think the Federal Circuit has something important to teach.
The lesson goes back to the question of reviewing district court
fact-finding. While I am also somewhat skeptical about over-reliance
on rigid rules, the Federal Circuit deserves credit for taking its role in
supervising the lower courts seriously. That is what made the court
such a success in patent law circles, and there is a lesson there for the
Supreme Court. As two of my colleagues, Sam Estreicher and John
Sexton noted twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court’s own docket
is cluttered with cases that arise directly from that Court’s failure to
75
provide clear analytical directions. Now that the Supreme Court is
taking fewer cases, that failure may become even more serious. Here,
the Federal Circuit’s responsiveness could act as a template for the
Court.

73. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346 n.3, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085.
74. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 39 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1
(1981)), cert. granted sub nom., Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), and argued sub
nom., Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2009).
75. See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 812 (1984) (“In our
view, the Court should act as the manager of the federal judicial system, overseeing
the work of the federal and state courts, and intervening only when necessary to
resolve fundamental interbranch or federal-state clashes or to render a final
resolution of a question that has ripened for decision after percolation in the lower
courts.”).
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In other respects, however, this is a place where the Supreme Court
has more experience, and so the Federal Circuit has much to learn.
First, there is the issue of writing informative opinions. One reason
to think of the Federal Circuit as filling an institutional vacuum is
because it is a court of last resort. As I tell my students, for patent
law, the Federal Circuit usually is the Supreme Court. But if it is, it
has to act that way. It cannot play a policy role unless it tells us what
the policy is. Well-articulated policy is also important for supervising
the lower courts. Indeed, it is a tool that might replace at least some
76
of the Federal Circuit’s famous rigidity. That is, the better the trial
court understands the policy that the Federal Circuit is trying to
achieve, the more likely it will do what the Federal Circuit thinks is
required.
A change might also help to clear the court’s dockets. Federal
Circuit judges have complained about appeals that are built around
nothing more than minor changes in the wording of its holdings.
But if the litigants better understood the underlying policy, these
linguistic variations might seem less salient to them.
Another issue concerns what I call the repeat player disadvantage.
A problem for courts of last resort, or for a court that has an
institutional role in setting policy, is that the law it hands down can
require revision. Justice Brennan used to call this “damage control.”
A new rule could be wrong, it might be confusingly formulated, or it
may wind up applying to situations the court did not foresee. To do
damage control, the court must take the issue up again. And therein
lies the problem: litigants have to persuade the court to reconsider
an issue it has already laid to rest, and that is not always comfortable.
Repeat players—attorneys who appear before a court regularly—may
not want to annoy the judges and jeopardize their credibility in
77
future cases. So, for example, John Duffy and Craig Nard note that
the number of PTO certiorari petitions plummeted after the Federal
78
Circuit was established. As the quintessential repeat player, perhaps
it has been trying to avoid that kind of friction.
Other litigators may also be facing this issue. It seems to me that
one such example is the common law experimental use defense.
79
In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit seemingly reduced
76. See Dreyfuss supra note 9, at 803 (“The elaboration of policy would make the
law more comprehensible, and thus easier to apply reproducibly.”).
77. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or
Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1570 (2006).
78. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1641 n.79 (2007).
79. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1746 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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the defense quite radically and that has caused a great deal of
consternation in the research community. The court could have
done damage control in Merck, which also involved
80
experimentation, and in fact, Judge Newman tried to limit Madey in
81
her separate opinion in that case. But the attorneys in Merck chose
82
to avoid the Madey issue and relied instead on a statutory defense.
They won, so they did right by their clients—but their decision has
left the scope of the common law exception in doubt for more than
half a decade.
How can courts of last resort avoid the repeat player disadvantage?
The Supreme Court does it first by recognizing the problem, and
second, by dropping footnotes about issues that need
reconsideration, by writing dissents, or by granting certiorari on a
case raising a problematic issue and then dismissing the case. These
actions serve as invitations: they empower otherwise reluctant lawyers
to find a good case to bring back an issue for reconsideration in a
nice clean case. It is a useful technique, and we do see a few Federal
Circuit dissents along those lines. For example, the en banc
reconsideration of the written description requirement in Ariad
83
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co. owed much to the persistent
84
opinion writing by Judges Rader and Linn; their dissents to the en
banc decision may also lead to Supreme Court consideration of the
85
issue.
But more could be done to make these invitations clear.
Or, perhaps, what is needed is something different: the Federal
Circuit bar needs to learn a lesson from the Supreme Court bar on
how to read these tea leaves and act on them.
80. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 545 U.S. 193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801
(2005).
81. Id. at 877–78, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (differentiating “research into the science and technology
disclosed in patents” from research tools, which are “product[s] or method[s] whose
purpose is use in the conduct of research”).
82. Id. at 864, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867 (majority opinion).
83. 560 F.3d 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d in part and
aff’d in part en banc, No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010).
84. See, e.g., id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (Linn, J., concurring);
LizardTech, Inc. v. Univ. of Cal., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1391,
1392 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307, 1325,
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., and Linn, J.,
separately dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
85. Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369, at *22, 28
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J., and Linn, J., separately dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
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To sum up, the Supreme Court’s recent interest in patent law is
highly intriguing. It has caused consternation in patent circles.
But it should not. There are many questions that these courts need
to work through jointly: questions on when specialization is
necessary, how it should be provided, under what circumstances a
specialized court should be able to “pull rank” and claim that its
expertise gives it a superior perspective. By teaching each other the
lessons that come from their unique perspectives, these two courts
can bring the Hruska Commission’s experiment to fruition and make
a truly significant contribution to judicial administration both here in
the United States and abroad. Equally important, the Federal Circuit
and the Supreme Court can together update patent law to the
emerging needs of the “Knowledge Economy.” As a student of both
patent law and institutional design, it is a pleasure to watch these
cases and this dialogue unfold. Thank you again for giving me the
opportunity to talk about one of my favorite subjects.

